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At the heart of this edited collection lies one affair: the Lautsi case and one 
symbol: the crucifix. In sixteen different chapters, the book offers multiple analysis of 
the challenge raised against the mandatory presence of crucifixes in Italian state 
schools. From a variety of perspectives, the chapters all address the fundamental 
underlying question of the place of religion in public education. Testimony to the 
complex questions left open by the European Court of Human Rights in its two 
dramatically opposite decisions
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 and to the rich and in-depth analysis of the 
contributors’ chapters, the book offers a fascinating read.  
The contributors, lawyers for most, come from a diversity of sub-disciplines 
and jurisdictions, ranging from legal theory, human rights, constitutional law; 
comparative law, law & religion and legal philosophy. They are spread across the UK, 
the Netherlands, Romania; Belgium, Canada, Italy, Hungary and the US. The book 
will be of interest to a large audience: public lawyers, human rights experts, 
educationalists, philosophers; sociologists, political scientists, scholars of religion.  
The book gives a balanced assessment of the Grand Chamber decision in 
which the obligatory presence of crucifixes on Italian state school wall classrooms 
was held not to infringe convention rights. Seven chapters against nine approve this 
final outcome but interestingly the reliance placed by the Grand Chamber on the 
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concept of margin of appreciation to support its conclusion is met with far greater 
caution.
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A few of the authors support the judicial restraint that the concept of the 
margin of appreciation carries. Jean-Marc Piret (chapter 3) thus underlines that the 
European Court of Human Rights does not have the standing of a Constitutional Court 
for Europe.
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 “What is important here is the question: who is competent?”4. This 
tension between the universality and the national/local enforcement of human rights is 
a recurring theme, studied in other worthwhile chapters such as Silvio Ferrari’s 
(chapter 1). Both Silvio Ferrari (Chapter 1) and Brett G. Scharffs (Chapter 2) in 
different ways emphasize the importance of dialogue. The Grand Chamber’s outcome 
in that sense may be praised for allowing the dialogue to continue. By contrast, others 
regret the lack of audacity of the Court: Roland Pierik (Chapter 8); Carla M. Zoethout, 
(Chapter 16).  
Unsurprisingly, the question of the “who” is intimately linked to the 
substantive question of meaning. What does the symbol of the crucifix mean and is 
this meaning enough to amount to a violation under the Convention? Again, the 
answer to the question will depend largely on how the question is phrased. If the 
question focuses on the particular audience (children of impressionable age in 
hierarchical relationships) the answer is likely to be that the crucifix will have a 
coercive impact (Alison Mawhinney, Chapter 4). The same conclusion will follow if 
one focuses on the particular position of the crucifix as the emblem of the majority 
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religion (Stijn Smet, Chapter 5) or as a sign imposed by the power of the State (Jeoren 
Temperman, Chapter 6). But as very convincingly argued by Malcolm Evans 
(Chapter 13), the rights involved ensure that public education be delivered in a 
manner respectful of diversity. The convention does not require that an appearance of 
strict neutrality be enforced but demands that the educational experience is – in its 
substance – compliant with the plurality of convictions.  
Should one argue for the opposite position, public schools and by extension, 
possibly, the public sphere should then need to be stripped of all religious symbols. 
Conceptually a strict version of neutrality would follow. The collection reflects this 
debate about neutrality, intrinsic to the case. Some chapters support a strict version of 
the notion (chapter 8). Others offer middle ground solutions where preference for 
majority religion and neutrality become compatible (Wouter de Ben; Liviu and 
Gabriel Andreescu; Hana van Ooijen, in Chapters 7, 9 and 11 respectively).  
The Italian context – certainly – may easily welcome a strict version of 
neutrality (Carlo Panara, chapter 12) and arguments can be made in favour of such 
move for the sake of multiculturalism (as illustrated interestingly by the Canadian 
context by Richard Moon, Chapter 10). However, transferred to a European context, 
one may query whether the European Court is to decide for a particular form of 
Church/State arrangement across Europe
5
 - which leads us back to the question of the 
“who”. 
This overlap between the questions is reflected in the book. The concept of 
neutrality, highlighted as the overarching theme of part III of the book is actually one 
of the recurring themes in many chapters. One may also wonder in what way chapters 
4 to 12 are really less specifically about Lautsi than the last four, put together under 
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the title of “Lautsi-specific comments”. The comparative perspective developed in 
part IV is interesting but limited. A chapter comparing the concept of secularism in 
France and Italy would have shed further light on the case as would have a detailed 
analysis of the German position. But these minor queries about the overall structure 
and scope of the book take none of the value of the collection away.  
As the dialogue on the place of religion in the public sphere continues, this 
particular collection, edited by Jeroen Temperman, will offer a rich and fascinating 
contribution to the debate. 
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